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Abstract
We study the relation of ¯nancial development and the pace of technological
advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A ¯rm which is ¯nanced by
outside shareholders but run by managers has the prospect of a process inno-
vation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation requires ¯ring
old management and hiring new with skills appropriate for the new technique.
We show that subgame perfect equilibria in this game can be of two types.
In \entrenchment" equilibrium once the new technique has been announced
old style management raises their dividend payout su±ciently to preempt the
innovation. In \maximum rent extraction" equilibrium' managers are unable
or unwilling to match the impending productivity improvement and instead
respond by increasing their perquisites for the remaining time of their tenure.
We show that both equilibria involve several types of ine±ciencies and can
result in underinvestment in positive NPV projects. We discuss the role of
¯nancial innovation in reducing the ine±ciencies identi¯ed.
1 Introduction
This paper is an exploration of how ¯nancial contracting can determine the
pace of technical change in modern, developed economies. An important
characteristic of such economies is that most economic activity takes place
within large, complex organizations where the interests of the individuals
who make them up are very often in con°ict with one another. One of the
most important of such misalignments of interests results from the separation
of ownership and control, identi¯ed long ago by Berle and Means [1932] and
subsequently extensively studied in corporate ¯nance following the seminal
paper on agency cost by Jensen and Meckling [1976].1
In this paper we adopt a dynamic, agency theoretic model to examine
the pace of technological advance when ¯rms are owned by outside investors
but are run by professional managers. Because perfect monitoring is di±cult
to achieve, once a manager is in charge he has some latitude to make deci-
sions that favor his interests in opposition to those of outside shareholders.
There are limits to how much an incumbent manager can exploit his ad-
vantage as a ¯rm insider because he faces the threat of being replaced with
another outside manager with similar skills. However, if it is anticipated
that the potential replacement manager would also exploit his advantage as
insider to some degree, the incumbent's rent extraction will be curbed but
not eliminated altogether. Thus owners of ¯rms will tend to tolerate some
degree of organizational slack in the operation of assets under the prevailing
technology.
The interests of shareholders and managers may come into con°ict as well
when it comes to the issue of whether or not to adopt a new technique that
has become available. Often incumbent management has a vested interest in
seeing the ¯rm keep the existing technology. New technologies may require
new skills which incumbents do not have. Thus if the new technique is
adopted incumbents may be forced to retrain themselves, may ¯nd that they
are less productive relative to potential rivals, and could face the loss of
their jobs. The way that organizations deal with this potential opposition
by insiders will be an important determinant of both their pro¯tability and
their ability to grow.
1For a recent survey emphasizing the incomplete contracts approach to modeling cor-
porate ¯nance see Oliver Hart's monograph [1996]. We adopt the incomplete contracts
approach in the model presented here.
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We argue that the structure of the ¯rm's ¯nancial contracts can be an
important determinant of the performance of the ¯rm and of the economy
as a whole. In particular, we show that they can a®ect the speed with which
technological advances are adopted once they are available, the degree to
which productive investment opportunities are foregone, and the incentives
to create future growth opportunities (R&D). We will discuss how ¯nancial
development which allows for a wider array of ¯nancial contracts permits
these ine±ciencies to be reduced and therefore for the ¯rm to grow.
The theme of growth and ¯nancial development is taken up in a long and
illustrious literature including classic contributions by Schumpeter [1942] and
Gershenkron[1962]. An important line of study has been the empirical re-
search on the relation of measures of ¯nancial development and the rate of
economic growth. In this area Goldsmith [1969] is the seminal contribution
and the works of King and Levine [1993] are prominent recent contributions.
These contributions document a positive correlation between ¯nancial devel-
opment and growth. More recently, Rajan and Zingales [1998] ¯nd evidence
supporting the hypothesis that ¯nancial development stimulates growth.
There have been a number of attempts to give theoretical account of how
¯nancial development can promote growth. Greenwood and Jovanovic [1990]
make the case for two-way causality. That is, ¯nancial development fosters
growth by increasing the return on capital, and growth in turn provides the
funds to invest in ¯nancial institutions. Another line of theory explore dual
growth models where some agents are ¯nancially constrained (Banerjee and
Newman [1991] and Aghion and Bolton[1992]). Financial dualism is also at
the heart of the credit cycles theory of Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] which
has been seen as highly relevant to recent ¯nancial crises a®ecting emerging
markets.
Neither the empirical nor the theoretical literature just surveyed explicitly
addresses the source of imperfection in the ¯nancial sector. Our paper is an
attempt to do so. Speci¯cally we argue that the dynamic agency framework is
a natural setting for providing a micro foundation of the interaction between
¯nance and growth. The speci¯c focus here is how ¯nance can a®ect the
pace of adoption of a process innovation which becomes available as the
result of a fortuitous discovery. Another aspect of the issue is the impact
of ¯nancial contracting on the incentive to create growth opportunities by
R&D or otherwise. That issue is studied by Anderson and Nyborg [2001] in
a di®erent version of the dynamic agency framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
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the model and basic results. It describes two possible reactions of incum-
bents confronted by a potential technological improvement, each of which
engenders a speci¯c sort of ine±ciency. One, \entrenchment" will delay the
adoption of the new technique, possibly forever. The other, \maximum rent
extraction", may temporarily reduce shareholders' earnings in advance of im-
plementing the new technique, but it may also lead to liquidation. If this
is anticipated, it can be the source of underinvestment, either in bricks and
mortar or in ideas, at an earlier stage. Section 3 considers the implications of
the model for the behavior of equity prices. Section 4 discusses how ¯nancial
development which permits alternative forms of ¯nancial contracting can al-
leviate some of the agency problems highlighted in the basic model. Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model is adapted from the two-stage model of ¯rm growth introduced by
Anderson and Nyborg [2001]. The ¯rm is owned by outside shareholders and
has access to an existing technology (the \old technique") which generates
an in¯nite stream of cash °ows in the future. The ¯rm must be operated
by a manager who is hired from an in¯nitely deep pool of managers with
identical skills. Once appointed, a manager is able to divert some or all
of the current period's cash °ows for his own consumption of perquisites.
Since cash °ows are non-contractible2, shareholders are unable to prevent
this from occurring, but they are aware that it has occurred. If they are
unwilling to tolerate this rent extraction by the incumbent manager they
may replace him. Alternatively, they may liquidate the ¯rm and obtain its
value as scrap. While the ¯rm operates under the old technique, there is
the possibility that a discovery will be made that will make available a new,
improved technology (the \new technique") which will generate a higher level
of operating cash °ows if it is adopted instead of the old technique. There
is a waiting/transition period (the \minimal time to adoption") between the
time the new technique is announced and its earliest possible adoption date.
However, the e®ective time to adoption will exceed this if shareholders ¯nd
2As with other incomplete contracts models we assume that the non-contractible vari-
able (here taken to be cash °ows) is \observable but not veri¯ able". This means that it
would be impossible or extremely costly to enforce a contract contingent on this variable
in a court of law.
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it advantageous to delay its introduction. The new technique requires new
skills so that its adoption would require replacing the old management with a
new manager also recruited from an in¯nitely deep pool of identical managers
but with di®erent skills than the old vintage of managers.
We use the following notation.
² ¼1, the cash °ow per period under the old technique (non-contractible);
² ¼2, the cash °ow per period under the new technique (non-contractible);
² yit, the payout ratio at date t ; i.e., the fraction of cash °ow that a
manager of type i reports to investors (i = 1 for \old managers" and
i = 2 for \new managers");
² L, the liquidation value of the ¯rm;
² r, the discount rate per period;
² p, the probability that a new technology will be announced given that
none has been announced previously;
² N , the length of the transition period, i.e., the number of periods be-
tween the announcement of a new technology and its earliest possible
introduction.
At each date t, the following stage game is repeated until the ¯rm is
liquidated (which may be never): First, shareholders choose whether to retain
the incumbent manager, replace the incumbent manager and continue with
a new manager, or liquidate the ¯rm. In case of liquidation, the game ends,
shareholders receive the liquidation value L, and managers receive nothing.
Second, if the ¯rm is kept alive, the cash °ow ¼i is produced with i = 1 if the
manager is of the old type and i = 2 if he is of the new type, ¼2 > ¼1. The
manager who is in charge decides the payout ratio, yit 2 [0; 1]. Shareholders
receive a total dividend of yit¼i and the current manager receives (1¡ yit)¼i.
Finally, between periods, a new technique will be announced (assuming it
has not been announced before) with probability p.
For simplicity, we assume that managers are not paid a salary, perhaps
because their reservation wage is zero. Their compensation is therefore com-
pletely determined by the portion of the cash °ows they retain for themselves.
Managers are assumed to have no money initially so that shareholders cannot
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require newly engaged managers to buy shares of the ¯rm. Since we assume
that the managerial labor pool is in¯nitely deep, once a manager has been
¯red, he is re-hired with probability zero.
Formally the model is an in¯nitely repeated game. As a result we know
from the Folk Theorem there are likely to be in¯nitely many Nash Equilibria
in the game. As is common in these settings we focus on subgame perfect
equilibria in stationary strategies. Subgame perfection means that agents are
assumed to behave rationally in all possible situations, even in those which
do not occur in equilibrium. The analysis of the game proceeds recursively
from the subgame where the ¯rm has adopted the new technique and is being
operated by a new style manager.
2.1 A new technique has been adopted
As mentioned above, we focus on stationary equilibria where the new style
manager uses the same payout rate every period, i.e., y2t = y2 8t. We start
by taking this payout rate as given and ask what is the best response for
shareholders. Since any other outside manager would pay identical divi-
dends, shareholders have no reason to replace the current manager as long
as he sticks to his strategy. However, shareholders may do better by liqui-
dating the ¯rm. If they never ¯re the current outside manager, shareholders
receive dividends of y2¼2 every period forever. Therefore, at any date, the
shareholders will not liquidate if and only if
y2¼2
1 + r
r
¸ L:
This can be rearranged as
rL
(1 + r)¼2
· y2; (1)
which shows that the investors' incentive compatibility constraint (not to
liquidate) imposes a lower bound on y2.
To get the current management to pay out y2¼2 at every date, as has
been assumed in (1), there must be a credible threat of punishment if he
pays less. Since outside managers are indistinguishable from each other, it
is credible for shareholders to replace the current manager whenever he pays
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out less than y2¼2. Therefore, a best reply for shareholders is to choose
st+1 =
8><>:
retain if y2t ¸ y2 and y2 ¸ rL=(1 + r)¼2
replace if y2t < y2 and y2 ¸ rL=(1 + r)¼2
liquidate if y2 < rL=(1 + r)¼2.
(2)
Given that investors use (2), the best response of the current manager
depends on y2. If investors' incentive compatibility constraint (1) is not
satis¯ed, the best the manager can do is to divert the entire current cash
°ow to himself, i.e., set y2t = 0, since shareholders will liquidate no matter
what he does. More interestingly when investors' incentive compatibility
constraint is satis¯ed, the current manager knows that he will be retained
as long as he pays a dividend of y2¼2. If so, he will receive a constant
consumption stream of (1 ¡ y2)¼2 every period forever. His best alternative
is to divert the entire current cash °ow to himself, which will lead to him
being ¯red. Thus the manager pays out y2¼2 if and only if
(1¡ y2)¼21 + rr ¸ ¼2:
This can be written as
y2 · 11 + r ; (3)
which establishes that the manager's incentive compatibility constraint (to
pay dividends) imposes an upper bound on y2.
The LHS of the investors' incentive compatibility constraint (1) is increas-
ing in r, whereas the RHS of the manager's incentive compatibility constraint
(3) is decreasing in r. For small discount rates, there are multiple payout
ratios that simultaneously satisfy both incentive compatibility constraints.
However, for su±ciently high r, there is no incentive compatible payout ra-
tio. By equating the two expressions (1) and (3), we ¯nd that there is an
incentive compatible payout ratio if and only if r · r¤, where
r¤ ´ ¼2
L
: (4)
These results are depicted graphically in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Investors'(dashed line) and New-Style Managers'(solid line)
Incentive Compatibility Constraints: Parameters; L = 100 and
¼2 = 20;implying r¤ = 20%.
From this ¯gure we see two important points. First, for interest rates
less than 20%, there are multiple stationary going concern equilibria. That
is, there is a range of payout rates, y2, all consistent with investors' and
manager's incentive compatibility. Second, for interest rates in excess of
20%, there is no positive payout rate that simultaneously satis¯es both the
investors' and manager's incentive compatibility constraints. Hence, for these
high interest rates, the only equilibrium is liquidation. Finally, for any r it
is also possible to have a liquidation equilibrium (i.e., y2 = 0).
Recalling that y2 is the rate of payout that shareholders would expect
from a new manager, we can interpret y2 as an index of managerial moral
hazard prevailing in the ¯rm's operating environment. When y2 is relatively
high, prevailing moral hazard is relatively low. The potential replacement
managers serve as a relatively severe discipline on incumbents. In contrast,
when y2 is relatively low, the incumbents face little pressure to curb their
tendency for consuming perquisites. Prevailing moral hazard is relatively
high, and the potential replacement managers serve as a relatively lax dis-
cipline on incumbents. Nothing in the structure of our very stylized model
allows us to say with great con¯dence which equilibria will emerge. In reality
there may be may be features of accounting rules, corporate law, exchange
rules, public regulations, or even general social mores which determine the
behavior of the group of managers as a whole and which pin down the equi-
librium to a narrower range of possibilities. We will return to this issue in
Section 4 below. However, at this stage, we should emphasize that there is
nothing that automatically leads to e±cient outcomes. Indeed, as we have
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seen, for positive interest rates there is always some irreducible amount of
moral hazard (y2 << 1) so that investors never capture the full rents cre-
ated by the ¯rm. This will mean that there will always be the possibility of
underinvestment, i.e., positive NPV projects may be foregone by investors.
For future reference, it is useful to record the payo®s to shareholders and
managers once the new technique has been adopted and the ¯rm has settled
into a going concern equilibrium. The value of equity is
E2 = y2¼2
1 + r
r
:
The corresponding value of manager's present and future perquisite consump-
tion is
M2 = (1¡ y2)¼21 + rr :
We now consider the prior issue of whether an available new technique will
be adopted by shareholders.
2.2 A new technique has been announced
A critical stage in the life of an enterprise is when it is operating under
an existing technology and a new improved technology becomes available.
Will the improvement be adopted? To do so will often require changing
management. However, incumbents may take steps to impede the change
and to secure their positions.
In our framework where shareholders can hire and ¯re the managers, the
adoption of the new technique is equivalent to replacing the old-style manage-
ment with new. Therefore we study the decision of whether or not to replace
existing old management. We do so in the context of a stationary equilib-
rium where, before the new technique is announced, shareholders retain the
incumbent as long as he uses a payout rate of y1 or larger.3 An interesting
aspect of our analysis is the extent to which an incumbent manager may
change the payout rate upon the announcement of a new technique.
Suppose the ¯rst date at which the new technology can be implemented is
t = T . At that date, investors will implement the change only if they expect
the ¯rm to be more valuable under the new management operating the new
technique. This will depend upon the equilibrium y2¼2 that is anticipated
3Constraints on y1 are studied below.
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and how it compares to the dividend payout of incumbents. Let y1T¡i be the
payout rate adopted by old style incumbents in the transition period i dates
before T .
Consider the decision one period before the new technique can be im-
plemented (t = T ¡ 1). If the ¯rm would not be viable as a going concern
under new managers (y2 = 0), the incumbent faces no additional disciplinary
threat by the new technique. The only discipline he faces is that exerted by
other managers similar to himself or the threat of liquidation. The analysis
in this case would be the same as in the previous subsection, but with old
style managers' payout rate, y1, substituting for new style managers' pay out
rate, y2. Another case where the imminent arrival of new style managers
with a new technique has no impact is where the equilibrium dividend under
new-style management is less than that which would be paid by alternative
old-style management (y2¼2 · y1¼1). In sum, if moral hazard among the
new vintage of managers would be extremely high, in equilibrium, the ¯rm
will continue operating the old technique with the incumbent manager.
Consider now the more interesting case where the new technique would
be viable and y2¼2 > y1¼1 so that it serves as a new threat to incumbent,
old-style managers. Under what conditions will the incumbent retain control
of the ¯rm?
Shareholders will be willing to retain incumbent management if they will
pay at least as much in dividends as would the new management operating
the new technique. Thus if the incumbent seeks to retain control he must
match dividends, i.e.,
y1T¡i¼1 = y2¼2 8i· N:
At date T ¡ 1, the alternative to matching dividends is to consume all the
present periods cash °ow and be replaced. Thus, assuming it is feasible to do
so (¼1 ¸ y2¼2), the old-style incumbent will match dividends at date T ¡ 1
and remain in control if and only if
(¼1 ¡ y2¼2)1 + rr ¸ ¼1;
or, equivalently,
y2 · ¼1¼2
1
1 + r
: (5)
Thus only if the new style management's payout rate would not be too high
compared to the relative productivity of the old technique will the old-style
incumbent attempt to retain control of the ¯rm.
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Let us now assume that the incumbent's incentive compatibility con-
straint at date T ¡ 1, (5), holds and consider his decision one period earlier
(T ¡ 2). What must an incumbent do in order to satisfy shareholders? The
shareholders' alternative to retaining incumbent management is to replace-
ment himwith an equivalent old-style manager. This manager would produce
¼1 at T ¡ 1 and would choose to match new technique managers' dividends
if it is optimal to do so, which is our working assumption. Thus at T ¡ 2
the incumbent manager would need to set y1T¡2¼1 = y2¼2 in order to retain
control. Since the alternative is to consume the entire current cash °ow ¼1,
we see that the incentive compatibility condition for incumbent managers at
T ¡ 2 is also given by (5). Hence, the incumbent would choose to match at
T ¡ 2 if he expects to do so at T ¡ 1.
The same analysis can be repeated for earlier periods. Consequently, if
the incumbent manager would choose at T ¡ 1 to match the new technique's
dividend, then he would choose to do so at all earlier times in the transi-
tion period. Hence, in this case, once the new technique is announced, the
dividend would immediately jump to the new (matching) level. As a result,
shareholders would get the full bene¯t of the announced technique, even
before the new technique would become viable. This is particularly interest-
ing because under entrenchment, the new technique will actually never be
implemented.
Consider next the case that (5) is not satis¯ed. In this case, at T ¡ 1 the
incumbent manager would anticipate being replaced by a new-style manager
and would therefore consume maximumperquisites, i.e., set y1T¡1 = 0. What
happens one period earlier? At T ¡2, the incumbent manager has no credible
means of committing to paying out next period. Therefore, at T ¡ 2, the
incumbent also chooses to divert all cash °ows to himself, i.e., set y1T¡2 =
0. In response to this, shareholders may choose to ¯re the incumbent and
temporarily replace him with another old-style manager. This analysis can
be repeated for earlier dates in the transition period. The implication is that
if (5) does not hold, then y1T¡i = 0 during the transition period.
This shows that if (5) does not hold, shareholders will go N periods
without a dividend before they can implement the new technique and receive
dividends. Instead of waiting these N periods before receiving any cash,
shareholders may instead decide to liquidate as soon as the new technique is
announced. They choose to liquidate if and only if (5) does not hold and
y2¼2
r(1 + r)N¡1
· L: (6)
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This shows that unless y2 is su±ciently high, the announcement of a new
and improved technique may actually lead to the foreclosure of the business.
What happens is that old-style incumbents, who see that they soon will
be replaced by new-style managers, accelerate their perquisite consumption
and, in the process, reduce dividends to such an extent that shareholders are
better o® closing the ¯rm down because the period of transition is too long.
The following proposition summarizes the discussion so far.
Proposition 1 Suppose at date T ¡ N that a new technique is announced
which can be implemented at time T and which will generate cash °ows of ¼2
in perpetuity if operated by new-style managers with appropriate skills. (a)
If the equilibrium dividend payout rate of new-style managers satis¯es, y2 ·
¼1
¼2
1
1+r ,then incumbent old-style managers will set y1T¡i¼1 = y2¼2 8i · N .
Old-style incumbent management will be retained and the new technique will
not be implemented. (b) If y2 > ¼1¼2
1
1+r old-style managers will set y1T¡i =
0 8i · N . If (6) does not hold, then at time T old-style managers will be
replaced and the new technique will be implemented. Otherwise, shareholders
liquidate the ¯rm when the new technique is announced at date T ¡N .
The proposition merits some comments. First, the reaction of old-style
management to the announcement of an improved technique has a knife-edge
property. In an entrenchment equilibrium (part a of the proposition) the
announced improvement is minor or will be subject to considerable moral
hazard. The result is that old-style management takes measures to secure
their positions. In a maximum rent-extraction equilibrium (part b of the
proposition where the ¯rm is viable after the new technique is implemented)
the improvement is major or moral hazard would not be too great. Old-
style incumbents will react to the announcement by consuming maximum
perquisites during the time that they remain on the job.
Second, in entrenchment equilibria the new technique is not implemented
which is socially ine±cient. Nevertheless, shareholders experience an increase
in dividends as incumbents are forced to pay out a higher fraction of the
cash °ows. Thus measured productivity of the ¯rm may increase even though
there has been no improvement in real productivity. It is simply that rent
extraction by management has decreased. There has been a redistribution
of rents from managers to shareholders.
Third, in the maximum rent-extraction equilibrium, the new technique is
implemented at the earliest possible date, which is ex post socially e±cient.
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Nevertheless, the shareholders experience a precipitous drop in earnings upon
the announcement of the new technique. Only later, when the new technique
is implemented will earnings improve. The distribution of the bene¯ts of the
new technique is complicated. The clear bene¯ciaries are the new managers
with the skills adapted to the new technique who will capture a share of the
rents once it is adopted. Shareholders may gain because the dividend paid
under the new techniquemay be higher than under the old, but they certainly
lose during the transitional time of N periods when earnings are negligible.
Old managers lose out on the bene¯t of being able to extract a fraction of the
rents on the old technique inde¯nitely into the future. However, they gain
because, as a group, they capture all the rents during the N transitional
periods. Finally, we should not forget that if the transition period is too
long, shareholders may prefer to liquidate the ¯rm instead of going through
the entire transition period without receiving dividends.
Notice that the last three points imply that shareholders may have a bias
against lines of business that are susceptible to major advances. For if the
incumbent management perceives that it will one day be made redundant,
it will be di±cult to convince them to abstain from short-term rent extrac-
tion. In contrast, when the ¯rm is exposed to less radical improvements,
incumbents can be induced to strive harder even if they are not under the
immediate threat of replacement by the new technique.
For future reference we note the value of equity during the transition
period between the time the new technique has been announced and the
time it can be ¯rst implemented. If there is an entrenchment equilibrium,
E1T¡i = y2¼2
1 + r
r
8i · N:
If in contrast, if there is a maximum rent-extraction equilibrium,
E1T¡i =
1
r(1 + r)i¡1
y2¼2 8i ·N:
The fact that a large-scale improvement may be preceded by a period of rent
extraction will potentially be an impediment to certain investments in the
¯rst place. We now complete the analysis of the problem by considering the
initial period before the new technique has been announced.
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2.3 An old technique is in place and a new technique
has not been announced
At an earlier stage when the ¯rm is operating the old technique and a new
technique has yet to be announced, both investors and old-style managers
are aware that a new technique may be announced at any time. Players will
evaluate the situation under certain assumptions about the stochastic process
governing the arrival of new technique announcements. Very little will be lost
from our analysis if we assume this process to be of a very simple sort. In
particular, we assume that with probability p there is an announcement of
a new technique of known size, ¼2 (given that a new technique has not been
announced previously). Furthermore, this distribution is common knowledge
among all agents involved.
Given this assumption the model is time-homogenous, and we will char-
acterize stationary subgame perfect equilibria. The analysis follows along
the same lines as the case studied above where a new style manager has been
hired to run the ¯rm under the new technique.
Each period investors decide whether or not to liquidate the ¯rm, to
continue the ¯rm under a replacement manager, or to continue the ¯rm
under the incumbent manager. Given that potential replacement managers
are playing a stationary strategy where y1t = y1, shareholders will be willing
to retain the incumbent if his payout ratio is at least as great as this level
and if the current dividend plus the continuation value of equity is at least
as great as the liquidation value. Let E1 be the value of equity as a going
concern under the old technique and let E¤1 be the value equity announced at
the end of the period. Given the stationary nature of the problem we have,
E1 = y1¼1 +
1
1 + r
[(1¡ p)E1 + pE¤1];
which can be rearranged as
E1 =
y1¼1r + y1¼1 + pE¤1
r + p
:
Hence, investors will not liquidate if and only if
y1 ¸ L(r + p)¡ pE
¤
1
¼1(1 + r)
: (7)
Incumbents will choose to pay out y1 if the current consumption of
perquisites plus the continuation value of staying in charge is at least as
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great as one period's cash °ow. Let M1 be the value of being an incumbent
retained under the old technique and let M ¤1 be the value of being an incum-
bent old-style manager just after the announcement of the new technique.
We have
M1 = (1 ¡ y1)¼1 + 11 + r [(1¡ p)M1 + pM
¤
1 ];
which can be solved as
M1 =
(1¡ y1 )¼1r + (1 ¡ y1)¼1 + pM ¤1
r + p
:
Thus the incumbent manager's incentive compatibility condition, M1 ¸ ¼1,
can be written as
y1 · 1 ¡ p1 + r +
pM ¤1
¼1(1 + r)
: (8)
Conditions (7) and (8) give the lower and upper bounds of payout ratios for
incumbent old-style management that are compatible with maintaining the
¯rm as a going concern under the old technique. As in the analysis of the
going concern under the new technique, given r there may be an interval
of payout rates that are consistent with going concern equilibria. But it
also may be that the ¯rm will be liquidated in equilibrium. However, here
the analysis is complicated by the probability of an announcement of a new
technique and the values for the managers (M ¤1 ) and shareholders (E¤1) after
the announcement of a new technique. These in turn will depend upon the
length of the transition phase and whether the transition would be one of
entrenchment or of maximal rent-extraction. Next, we analyze these cases in
turn.
2.3.1 Announced new technique induces entrenchment
Let us suppose that following the announcement of a new technique the opti-
mal response of the old-style manager would be entrench himself by matching
dividends (see Proposition 1). In this case the post-announcement values of
equity and manager wealth are
E¤1 = y2¼2
1 + r
r ;
and
M ¤1 = (¼1 ¡ y2¼2)1 + rr :
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Using the ¯rst expression the incentive compatibility condition for sharehold-
ers can be written as
y1 ¸ L(r + p)¼1(1 + r) ¡ p
y2¼2
¼1r
: (9)
Similarly, the incentive compatibility condition for managers can be written
as
y1 · 1¡ p1 + r +
p(¼1 ¡ y2¼2)
¼1r
: (10)
Notice that condition (9) is decreasing in y2¼2. The interpretation is that the
higher will be the dividends paid once the new technique is announced the
lower the pre-announcement payout rate that would be tolerated by investors.
Similarly, condition (10) is decreasing in y2¼2. The interpretation is that the
higher would be the payout required to retain his job after the announcement
of a new technique, the less willing will be the old-style manager to forego
perk consumption in the present.
2.3.2 Announced new technique induces maximum rent extrac-
tion
Here, we suppose that following the announcement of a new technique, the
optimal response of the old-style manager would be divert all cash °ows
to himself while he is in charge (see Proposition 1). In this case the post-
announcement value of equity is
E¤1 = max
"
1
r(1 + r)N¡1y2¼2; L
#
: (11)
Suppose that investors choose not to liquidate during the transition period.
Then, assuming that shareholders will adopt a policy of replacing the in-
cumbents with alternative old-style managers until the new technique can be
implemented, the value for incumbent management after an announcement
is
M ¤1 = ¼1:
In this case, using (11), investors' pre-announcement incentive compatibility
condition (7) can be written as
y1 ¸ L(r + p)¼1(1 + r) ¡
py2¼2
¼1
1
r(1 + r)N
: (12)
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Similarly, the pre-announcement incentive compatibility condition for old-
style managers (8) can be written as
y1 · 1(1 + r): (13)
Notice that condition (12) is decreasing in y2¼2 for reasons similar to the
case where announcements induce entrenchment. In short, the higher the
new technique dividend the better news is its announcement and the more
tolerant will be shareholders of old management's rent extraction. Also, it
should be noted that this expression is increasing in N . The interpretation is
that the longer the delay between announcement of a new technique and its
implementation, the longer the period that shareholders go without dividends
and thus the less tolerant will shareholders be of current rent extraction by
incumbent management. The old managers incentive compatibility condition
(13) is identical to that of new managers once the new technique is implement.
2.4 The incentive to invest
So far we have studied a ¯rm that is up and running. In this subsection,
we address whether investors would advance equity capital to get the ¯rm
started in the ¯rst place. The analysis above shows that some fraction of the
cash °ows of the ¯rm can be diverted by insiders. These take three speci¯c
forms: perquisite consumption by old managers under normal operations of
the old technique, high perquisite consumption by old managers once they
are lame ducks, and normal perquisite consumption by new managers once
the new technique is in place. The relative sizes of these rent concessions to
insiders depends upon the parameters of the model and the degree of moral
hazard prevailing among the pool of prospective managers. Even in the
circumstances most favorable for shareholders these concessions cannot be
reduced to zero because the payout ratio, y2, is strictly less than 1 for positive
interest rates. Therefore there is inevitably the possibility of underinvestment
in productive projects.
To make this explicit let V be the ¯rst-best value of the project operating
under the old technique with the prospect that a new technique will be
announced and let V ¤ be its value after the new technique is announced.
These satisfy V = ¼1 + 11+r [(1¡ p)V + pV ¤], so that
V =
¼1(1 + r) + pV ¤
r + p
:
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Once the new technique has been announced the ¯rst-best action is to im-
plement the improvement as soon as possible. Consequently,
V ¤ =
¼1((1 + r)N ¡ 1)
r(1 + r)N¡1
+
¼2
r(1 + r)N¡1
:
Combining the last two expressions, we ¯nd that the ¯rm's ex ante value is
V =
¼1(1 + r)
r + p
+
p¼1((1 + r)N ¡ 1)
(r + p)r(1 + r)N¡1
+
p¼2
(r + p)r(1 + r)N¡1
: (14)
The ¯rst term on the RHS is the value of an annuity of ¼1 which dies with a
conditional probability of p each period. The second term is the value of an
annuity ¼1 of which is born with a conditional probability of p each period
and which would last N periods. The third term is the value a perpetual
claim of ¼2 which would be announced with a probability of p each period
and which would commence N periods after announcement.
Underinvestment occurs whenever the value of equity of the ¯rm operat-
ing under the old technique would be less than V . As we have seen, the value
of equity depends upon whether a new technique announcement is expected
to induce entrenchment, maximum rent-extraction, or liquidation. In the
former case, the results above can be used to show that the initial value of
equity is
E1 =
y1¼1(1 + r)
r + p
+
py2¼2(1 + r)
(r + p)r
: (15)
Comparing this with (14) above we see that if new technique announcements
induce entrenchment, we may have underinvestment ex ante because (a) old
managers may pay out less than the cash °ows the ¯rm generates while they
are in charge (y1 < 1), (b) dividends during transition may be less than
available cash °ows (¼1 > y2¼2), and (c) payout of new-style managers will
certainly be less than full (y2 < 1, see equation 3).
Similarly, if new technique announcements will give rise to a period of
maximum rent-extraction (but not liquidation), the initial value of equity is
E1 =
y1¼1(1 + r)
r + p +
py2¼2
(r + p)r(1 + r)N¡1 : (16)
Comparing this with (14) above we see that in this case we may have un-
derinvestment ex ante because (a) old managers may pay out less than the
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cash °ows generated under them (y1 < 1), (b) dividends during transition
are totally absent, and (c) payout of new-style managers will be less than full
(y2 < 1).
Finally, if new technique announcements will give rise to the immediate
liquidation of the ¯rm, the initial value of equity is
E1 =
y1¼1(1 + r) + pL
r + p
: (17)
In this case, underinvestment ex ante would arise because (a) old-style man-
agers' payout rate is y1 < 1, (b) the ¯rm is prematurely liquidated, and (c)
the new technique is not implemented.
Given limited liability, underinvestment will certainly occur any time a
positive NPV project cannot issue equity claims that cover the costs of initial
investment. In fact, underinvestment problems may be more severe than
this. For example, if initial investments require the participation of two or
more parties with interests that cannot be perfectly well-aligned, contracting
problems among these agents may also serve as an impediment to productive
investment. This idea is develop at length by Anderson and Nyborg [2001]
who study a ¯rm whose original product idea is the result of an R&D project
by an entrepreneur but which requires outside ¯nance for capital investments.
Other forms of possible, early-stage contracting ine±ciency are studied in the
literature on venture capital.
2.5 Examples
In order to make explicit some of the general properties of the model just
discussed, we now consider a series of speci¯c parametric examples. We
suppose throughout that ¼2 = 20; L = 100, and p = :1. This means that
as long as r · 0:2, there will be a payout rate y2 such that the ¯rm would
be viable under the new technique. If r = 0:2 the only viable payout rate is
y2 = 0:8333. For lower interest rates there will be a range of viable payout
rates. For the purposes of what follows, we assume y2 = 0:8333.
When will the announcement of this new technique induce entrenchment?
To investigate this, recall that our analysis has been carried out under the
assumption that y1¼1 < y2¼2, where y1 denotes the payout rate of old-style
manager before the new technique is announced. Supposing that ¼1 = 18:334,
we see that our analysis is restricted to the case that y1 < :909. Now, upon
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the announcement of a new technique, the old-style manager will prefer to
entrench himself by matching dividends if ¼1 ¸ 16:667(1+r) byProposition 1.
So entrenchment will happen for r · 0:1 . In this case the post-announcement
value of equity is given by: E¤1 = 16:6671+rr . Furthermore, the ¯rm will be
viable before the announcement under old management under payout rates
satisfying (by equations 9 and 10),4
y1 ¸ Max
"
100(r + :1)
18:334(1 + r)
¡ :1 16:667
18:334r
; 0
#
and
y1 ·Min
"
:9
(1 + r)
+
:1(18:334¡ 16:667)
18:334r
; 1
#
:
Figure 2 plots the RHS of these two expressions as functions of r. If r = :1
the ¯rm is viable under old management for payout rates in the interval
y1 2(0:0826; 0:909). For lower interest rates there is a wider range of viable
payout rates. For r »= 0:094 the lower bound of the payout rate reaches
y1 = 0: This shows that if the discount rate is very low, investors may be
willing to forego dividends initially in the anticipation of very high dividends
once a new technique is announced.
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Figure 2: Investors'and Old-Style Manager's Incentive Compatibility
Contraints before Announcement of New Technique Under Entrenchment
4In developing this example we take explicitly into account certain inequality restric-
tions which were left implicit in the general analysis above. In particular we require
0 · y1 · 1:
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To examine maximum rent extraction equilibria let us assume that it is
not feasible for an old-style manager to match the dividends that would be
paid by a new-style manager. This will be the case for example if ¼1 = 15.
Applying this assumption (rather than ¼1 = 18:334 as was assumed in Figure
2), the post-announcement value of equity is,
E¤1 = Max
"
16:667
r(1 + r)N¡1
; 100
#
:
Figure 3 plots E¤1 as a function of N for r = :10.
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Figure 3: Post-Announcement Value of Equity as a Function of N
This illustrates that equity value will be extremely sensitive to the length
of the transition period, N . In what follows let us ¯x this at N = 5. Under
what conditions will the ¯rm be viable under the old management before
the announcement of the new technique? We are interested in an answer to
this question under the maximum rent extraction scenario, which in partic-
ular means that the ¯rm will not be liquidated upon the announcement. In
other words, upon the announcement, the continuation equity value must be
above 100. Given the parameter values we are working with, this implies
that r · :10985. Now, the payout rates that are viable before the announce-
ment are those which simultaneously satisfy investors' incentive compatibility
constraint (9),
y1 ¸ 100(r + :1)15(1 + r) ¡
:1£ 16:667
15
1
r(1 + r)5
;
and the old-style manager's incentive compatibility constraint (10),
y1 · 11 + r :
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The RHS of these two expressions plotted as function of r are given in Fig-
ure 4.
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Figure 4: Investors' and Old-Style Managers' Incentive Compatibility
Contstraints Before Announcement of New Technique Under Maximum
Rent Extraction During Transition Period
At r = :1, the range of viable payout rates is, y1 2 (0:522 ; 0:909). At
lower interest rates a wider range is viable. For r »= 0:072 the lower bound
of the payout rate reaches y1 = 0:
3 The Behavior of Equity Prices Over Time
The model we have studied here has direct implications for the behavior of
equity prices in the face of announcements of technological advances. The
prediction is that an announcement will have one of two possible reactions
depending upon the size of the improvement (¼2 ¡ ¼1) and other param-
eters of the problem. When announced improvements are relatively small,
equity prices will immediately increase to a level that fully anticipates the ex-
tent of the improvement. This is the pattern associated with \entrenchment
equilibrium". Despite the fact that the entrenched managers are e®ectively
resisting the implementation of the new technique, this is a rational response
for the stock market because reported earnings improve immediately upon
the announcement.
In the case of relatively large improvements, the model predicts that
there will be an immediate change in equity prices. This may be a price
fall, but if so prices will eventually rise to a new level once the innovation is
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implemented. However, the reaction could also be so extreme that the ¯rm
is liquidated.
These various patterns are depicted in the two next ¯gures. In both
¯gures the parameters are: p = 0:1; r = 0:1; y2¼2 = 16:667; L = 0; y1 = 0:5;
the announcement occurs at t = 20 and the earliest implementation date is
T = 35. . In Figure 5 we have assumed that ¼1 = 18:334, which implies that
upon announcement of the new technique, old-style mangers will entrench
themselves.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
10 20 30 40t
Figure 5: Equity Prices over time, entrenchment equilibrium; New
technique announced at t = 20
In this case; equity prices are 142:09 for periods 1 through 19, then they
jump to 183:34 in period 20 and stay at that level thereafter. In contrast in
Figure 6 we have assumed that ¼1 = 15 so that the announcement gives rise
to maximum rent extraction equilibrium.
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Figure 6: Equity Prices over time, maximum rent extraction equilibrium;
New technique announced at t = 20
22
Then equity prices are at 98:169 from periods 1 through 19. In period 20
they fall to 43: 889 and rise subsequently reaching 183:34 in period 35.
These examples are very stylized because of the stationary nature of our
model and the assumption that the only uncertainty concerns the arrival
time of the new technique announcement. In more realistic settings one
could capture other properties familiar in real world equity price movements.
However, the basic price dynamics we have produced with our model for
the core of the informal arguments that have been put forward to account
for some of the behavior of equity prices in recent times. See Hobijn and
Jovanovich [1999] for a strongly argued discussion of the empirical evidence
that develops this line of reasoning.
4 Financial Development
4.1 Better monitoring of insiders
The model we have adopted makes the extreme assumption that no contract
can be enforced which is contingent on paying out cash °ows. This is meant
to capture the fact that in almost all situations the agents who are on the
inside of ¯rms necessarily have some latitude to make decisions on behalf of
the ¯rm which are nevertheless motivated by considerations of their personal
interest. The assumption of non-contractible cash °ows should not be taken
too literally. In reality, insiders are generally constrained in a variety of re-
spects. They are obliged to account for their actions to outside investors, and
the accounts they report must meet certain standards. Norms of account-
ability do vary considerably from one context to another. Indeed, one of the
hallmarks of highly developed ¯nancial environments is that there are well-
established standards for reporting information pertinent to investors that
are required by accounting standards, exchange listing requirements, or se-
curities regulation. When reporting standards are high outside investors are
able to monitor insider decisions more e®ectively and can reduce the scope
for the opportunistic personal use of company resources. In other words,
investors need not rely solely on the threat of punishments if they perceive
excessive or abusive diversions of company resources.
Financial development in this regard could be re°ected in our model in
a variety of ways. The simplest way would be to impose a monitoring con-
straint whereby a minimum payout rate could be enforced. If payout rates
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fell below this minimum level, managers would immediately be punished by
replacement and possibly other actions. Figure 7 depicts the combinations
of r and y2 that are consistent with the continued operation of the ¯rm if the
monitoring constraint is set at 42%.
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Figure 7 Payout Rates with Monitoring Constraints: Solid line: New-Style Manager's
IC. Dotted line: Investors' IC. Dashed: Monitoring constraint. Parameter values:
L = 100, ¼2 = 20.
For interest rates less than about 10%, the e®ective lower bound on the
manager's payout rate is given by the monitoring constraint at 42%. This
will reduce the range of possible equilibria for low interest rates. Conse-
quently, in this range of interest rates, it will raise the lower bound of pos-
sible values of equity and therefore will tend to alleviate underinvestment
problems.
This is quite straight-forward within the context of our model; however,
it describes a real world phenomenon of considerable importance. Namely,
¯nancial development which permits more e®ective monitoring of ¯rm insid-
ers will expand considerably the use of equity markets in the ¯nancing of
productive investments. Stated otherwise, one aspect of ¯nancial underde-
velopment is that outside investors have few means of e®ectively monitoring
insiders and therefore are exposed to a low level of managerial integrity that
is the norm. In such an environment, only extremely productive investments
will be viable as widely held, publicly quoted companies. Many productive
investments whither on the vine because the bene¯ts of the product idea
would be hijacked by ¯rm insiders so that outside investors are not willing
to participate.
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4.2 Alternative ¯nancial contracts
Finance from outside investors can be obtained from contracts other than
common stock. The most obvious and wide-spread alternative to equity is
of course debt, either in the form of bank loans or in a more arm's length
form such as bonds. In the context of a model with non-contractible cash
°ows similar to the one treated here, Anderson and Nyborg [2001] study
both debt and equity in depth. It is shown that debt has both advantages
and disadvantages relative to equity. As a result, there are some productive
projects that will be viable under equity but not under debt, while there are
other projects which are viable under debt but not under equity.
The advantage of debt is that it limits outside investors' control rights;
creditors get control only in case of default. Hence, outside investors' incen-
tive compatibility constraint is not part of the analysis as long as debt is
being serviced. A disadvantage of debt is that the contingent control rights
makes it relatively easy for incumbent management to entrench itself. So
long as old management meets contractual debt service, investors cannot ef-
fect changes of management. To see this in the context of the model we have
studied here, suppose that old-style managers are able to meet contractual
debt service of d each period (¼1 > d). Then when a new technique becomes
available, incumbent management do not need to match potential dividends
(y2¼2) in order to stay on the job; rather, they merely continue paying the
debt service of d. Consequently, there is less of a tendency to implement
the improved technique once it becomes available. A second and more obvi-
ous di±culty is that if cash °ows are stochastic (not the case studied here),
solvent ¯rms may nevertheless fall into costly ¯nancial distress.
Financial development expands the panoply of forms of ¯nancial con-
tracting available. Consequently, ine±ciencies that persist when agents are
con¯ned to combinations of equity and straight debt possibly can be elim-
inated or at least reduced through the use of more sophisticated ¯nancial
structures. For example, given the announcement of a new technique which
has induced old managers to entrench themselves, there is a potential e±-
ciency gain to be realized if old-managers be induced to make way for the
new technique by compensating them for future perquisites foregone. This
could be done by a leveraged buy-out by new managers. In this they buy the
entire equity of the ¯rm and displaced old-style managers are compensated
with debt. See Anderson and Nyborg [2001] for a fuller discussion of these
techniques within the context of the two-stage model of ¯rm growth.
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4.3 Managerial incentive contracts
In the model considered here, the manager's compensation has been lim-
ited to a ¯xed salary per period (which without loss of generality we nor-
malized to zero) plus perquisites. This created an extreme divergence of
interests between management and shareholders { every dollar of increased
perquisite consumption by managers was a dollar less earnings for sharehold-
ers. This extreme assumption captures a generic feature of modern corpora-
tions; namely, few managers have su±cient initial wealth to buy 100 per cent
of the equity of the ¯rm, even if additional ¯nance were obtained by issuing
debt. In reality, however, certain forms of managerial compensation can be
found that may better align the interests of managers and shareholders. In
particular, compensating managers with shares or call options on shares is
intended to achieve this end.
To study this in our model, suppose the new technique has been imple-
mented and the current incumbent manager has been awarded a share ° of
the ¯rm. Potential replacement managers have no shares. Suppose further-
more that investors' strategy is to retain the incumbent as long as he uses
the payout rate y2 (which satis¯es investors' IC). The manager's alternative
is to divert all current cash °ows to himself, be replaced, and receive ° of
all future earnings. Thus the incumbent manager's incentive compatibility
condition is
(1¡ y2)¼21 + rr + °y2¼2
1 + r
r ¸ ¼2 + °
y2¼2
r ;
or
y2 · 11 + r(1 ¡ °): (18)
The RHS of this expression is increasing in °. In other words, the the max-
imum incentive compatible payout rate is enhanced by giving the manager
shares. This is because his interests are now more in line with those of outside
investors. As a consequence, the maximum possible interest rate for which
the ¯rm can be kept alive is enhanced. This is illustrated in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Investors' and New-Style Managers' Incentive Compatibility Constraints
under Di®erent Managerial Shareholdings: Dashed line: Manager's IC for ° = :5. Solid
line: Manager's IC for ° = 0. Dotted line: Investors' IC. Parameter values: L = 100,
¼ 2 = 20.
5 Conclusions
We have studied the relation of ¯nancial development and the pace of tech-
nological advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A ¯rm which is
¯nanced by outside shareholders, but run by managers has the prospect of a
process innovation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation re-
quires ¯ring old management and hiring new ones with skills appropriate for
the new technique. We show that subgame perfect equilibrium in this game
can be of two types. In \entrenchment" equilibrium once the new technique
has been announced old style management raises their dividend payout su±-
ciently to preempt the innovation. This is ine±cient socially but is bene¯cial
to shareholders because measured pro¯tability will increase at the time of the
announcement of the new technique. In \maximum rent extraction" equilib-
rium' managers are unable or unwilling to match the impending productivity
improvement and instead respond by increasing their perquisites for the re-
maining time of their tenure. This may lead to the immediate liquidation of
the ¯rm. But if not, it is ex post socially e±cient because the new technique
is eventually implement; however, it may be harmful for shareholders. We
show that moral hazard associated with both equilibria may result in ex ante
ine±ciency, because the resulting loss in equity value means that investors
may not be willing to advance the requisite funds to take all positive NPV
projects.
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Financial development can impact the model in several ways and can re-
duce ine±ciencies brought on by agency problems. Improved reporting stan-
dards can reduce the scope for diversion of cash °ows by insiders. More com-
plicated ¯nancial contracts can alleviate underinvestment problems. Manage-
rial incentive contracts can help as well. While improvements are possible
we also point to certain di±culties in achieving them, suggesting that the
process of ¯nancial development may indeed be a di±cult one.
References
[2001] Anderson, R.W. and K.G.Nyborg, 2001 \Financing and Corporate
Growth under Repeated Moral Hazard" Working Paper, London
School of Economics, Financial Markets Group.
[1992] Aghion, P. and P.Bolton, 1992, \Distribution and Growth in Models
of Imperfect Capital Markets,' The European Economic Review. 36
(1992) 603-611.
[1991] Banerjee, A. and A. Newman, 1991, `Risk-bearing and the Theory of
Income Distribution,' Review of Economic Studies. 58, 211-235.
[1932] Berle, A.A. and G.C.Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property MacMillan Publishing Co., New York.
[1962] Gershenkron, A. (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Per-
spective. Harvard University Press.
[1969] Goldsmith, R., 1969, Financial Structure and Development. Yale U.
P.
[1990] Greenwood, J. and B. Jovanovic, 1990, \Financial Development,
Growth and the Distribution of Income," Journal of Political Econ-
omy 98, 1076-1107.
[1996] Hart, O., 1996, Contracts and Corporate Financial Structure and De-
velopment. Oxford U. P.
[1999] Hobijn, B. and B. Jovanovic, 1999, \The Information Technology Rev-
olution and the Stock Market," working paper, New York University.
28
[1976] Jensen, M. and W.Meckling, 1976, \Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure," Journal of Financial
Economics. 305-60.
[1993] King, R.G.and R. Levine, 1993, \Financial Intermediation and Eco-
nomic Development," C.Mayer and X. Vives (eds.) Capital Markets
and Financial Intermediation. .Cambridge University Press.
[1997] Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore, 1997, \Credit Cycles" Journal of Political
Economy. 105 (2) 211-48
[1998] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny, 1998,
\Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.
[1998] Rajan, R.G. and L. Zingales, 1998, \Financial Dependence and
Growth," American Economic Review 88, 559-86.
[1942] Schumpeter, J. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy . Allen
and Unwin.
29
